What is single point of failure analysis?

A link-by-link check for the one failure that takes out a whole function, including the ones that only look redundant.

SUPPLY TO LIGHT · ASK OF EVERY LINK: WHAT IF IT FAILS ALONE? 1 · NO REDUNDANCY 4 SINGLE POINTS FEEDER ALL DARK single supply BUS ALL DARK single bus CCR ALL DARK no spare CABLE ALL DARK single circuit A LIGHT ONE LIGHT not a single point 2 · REDUNDANCY ADDED, CABLE SINGLE 1 SINGLE POINT LEFT: CABLE 2 FEEDERS NO EFFECT two supplies BUS + TIE NO EFFECT two sections CCR + SPARE NO EFFECT changeover CABLE ALL DARK still single A LIGHT ONE LIGHT not a single point 3 · LOOKS REDUNDANT, FAILS TOGETHER 1 HIDDEN: SHARED TRENCH 2 FEEDERS ALL DARK one shared trench BUS + TIE NO EFFECT two sections CCR + SPARE NO EFFECT changeover 2 CIRCUITS HALF LIT interleaved A LIGHT ONE LIGHT not a single point WHAT TO CHECK 1 TRACE THE CHAIN supply to light, link by link 2 ASK WHAT IF what goes dark, and for how long 3 FIND COMMON CAUSE shared trench, control supply, UPS 4 REMOVE, REDUCE, ACCEPT and write down which, and why SCHEMATIC · ONE CHAIN SHOWN · NOT A RISK ASSESSMENT
single point: all dark
backed up: no effect
partial loss
The Fact Redundant architecture

A single point of failure is any one component, cable, supply or control element whose failure alone takes out a function the airfield needs. Single point of failure analysis finds them on purpose: trace the chain from supply to light, and for each link ask what is lost if it fails alone, how much, and how long it takes to restore.

Each finding is then removed with redundancy, reduced with monitoring, spares or procedures, or accepted and recorded. The hardest ones to see are shared causes: two feeders in one trench, one control supply, one UPS, one network link, or a spare that has never been run. They look redundant on a drawing and fail together in practice.

This entry closes the redundant-architecture group: interleaved circuits, dual feeders, a standby CCR and a ring cable are the fixes, and this analysis is how you decide where each is needed and whether it really works.

Analysed

Every link checked, each single point removed, reduced or accepted on record.

Assumed

Redundancy trusted from the drawing; shared causes found only in a failure.

ElementIf it fails aloneFinding
Single feeder to the substationEvery CCR loses its supplySingle point; add a second feeder
One CCR per circuit, no spareCircuit dark until repairedSingle point; add a standby CCR
Two feeders in one trenchBoth lost togetherHidden single point; separate the routes
Shared control supply or UPSTransfer or remote control lostHidden single point; give it a second source
Single PLC or network linkRemote control and monitoring lostCheck what the lights do on loss of control
Standby never runFault found only when neededRedundancy not proven; test it
Any open point in one series loop (cable, connector, transformer primary)The whole circuit goes darkSingle point per circuit; limit with sound joints, testing and interleaved circuits
One lampOne light affectedNot a single point while the film cutout works; maintenance item
Purpose Find the one failure that takes out a function the airfield needs
Method Trace supply to light; ask what is lost if each link fails alone
Scope Power, cable, regulators, control, communications, and shared causes
Output Ranked list: consequence, restoration time, and the action chosen
Actions Remove with redundancy, reduce with monitoring and spares, or accept on record
Reference ICAO Doc 9157 Pt 5 · Annex 14 Ch. 8 · FAA AC 150/5340-30
Schematic, not a risk assessment. Which links matter, and what level of risk is acceptable, depend on the airfield, the operation and the operator's safety management system. Confirm against the design basis.
Entry 43 · Ring and loop cable arrangement Full Index · Division 07

Frequently Asked Questions

Q1What is single point of failure analysis?

It is a structured review that finds any single component, cable, supply or control element whose failure alone would take out a function the airfield needs. You trace the chain from supply to light, ask what is lost if each link fails on its own and how long it takes to restore, then decide whether to remove the weakness, reduce its effect or accept it knowingly.

Q2How is it done?

List the functions that matter, such as a runway centreline circuit or a stop bar. Trace each one from the utility supply through the feeder, bus, CCR, cable and controls to the lights. For every link ask what goes dark if it fails alone, how much and for how long, rank the findings, and record the action: add redundancy, add monitoring or spares, or accept the risk with a reason.

Q3What are examples of hidden single points of failure?

Two feeders in one trench, a single control or DC supply for the transfer scheme, one UPS, one PLC or network link for remote control, one junction box or handhole that several circuits pass through, a standby CCR that has never been run, and one spare or one person who knows how the system is set up. They look redundant on a drawing and fail together in practice.

Q4Is a single failed light a single point of failure?

No. A failed lamp normally affects only that light, because the film cutout in the isolating transformer keeps the series loop closed, so it is a maintenance item rather than a single point of failure. The questions that matter are about the links that carry many lights: the feeder, the bus, the CCR and the cable. Any open point in a series loop, such as a broken cable, a bad connector or an open transformer primary, takes the whole circuit dark, which is why the cable is a single point.

Q5Does adding redundancy always fix the problem?

No. Redundancy can be defeated by a shared cause, by the switching or changeover device itself, or by a spare that was never tested. It also adds parts, such as switchgear and interlocks, that can fail. After adding a layer, run the analysis again on the new arrangement.

Q6When is it done, and is it required?

Do it at design, after any significant change, and as part of periodic review. Whether a formal analysis is required depends on the operator's safety management system, the authority and the standard, so confirm against your design basis. It also feeds other methods, such as failure mode and effects analysis.

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